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How the “Crown Case”
Came to Trial and Why
Edwin Carawan

E

ARLY IN 336 B.C. the Athenian council passed Ctesiphon’s

proposal to crown Demosthenes for his service after the
defeat at Chaeronea, but Aeschines blocked the measure
with a suit for unlawful action (graphē paranomōn) before it could
be enacted in the assembly. If the case had gone to court at that
juncture a verdict in favor of Ctesiphon would have ratified his
decree, but at the end of that council’s year the case had not
been decided and the proposal became moot. And so the matter
stood for six years until 330, when the “Crown Case” came to
trial, Ctesiphon was acquitted, and Demosthenes was crowned.
Neither speech, nor later tradition, tells us plainly how this came
about.
Most of the historians who have taken up this question have
supposed that Aeschines revived the case when he saw an opportunity. He had begun the case before Philip’s death (3.219),
and, after Philip died, both sides were content to abandon it.
Years later, when the Spartan rebellion was crushed and defiance seemed futile, Aeschines could at last take revenge upon
his enemy. This was the standard assumption even in the 1830s,
when it was generally supposed that the delay was eight years
(not six).1 Westermann thought he could cut the delay in half by
Plut. Dem. 24 dated the proposal and the indictment to the archonship of
Chairondas (338/7), evidently relying on the document in Dem. 18.54.
Working with that date: Anton Westermann, De Aeschinis oratione advsersus
Ctesiphontem Commentatio (Leipzig 1833), esp. 10–12 and 23–27; and Rudolf
Rauchenstein, De tempore quo Aeschinis et Demosthenis orationes Ctesiphonteae habitae
sint, Commentatio (Aarau 1835). Both were preoccupied with the unequal treatment of Demosthenes’ career (as the orator himself ignores the period after
1
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showing that Demosthenes’ narrative indicates a trial in 334,
after Alexander demanded the surrender of the orator for his
role in the Theban insurrection. Rauchenstein argued to the
contrary, that (at that juncture) “the Athenians embraced and
protected [Demosthenes] with the deepest affection, as a man
most devoted to the patria.” As Rauchenstein saw it, the situation
in 330 was more inviting for Aeschines’ reprisal, after an even
more exhaustive display of Macedonian dominance. Fifty years
ago Cawkwell took much the same approach and effectively
disposed of some nagging reservations:2 there was, after all, no
statutory limit on the lawsuit (as scholars had supposed), and the
author of the proposal was never immune from prosecution.3 So,
surely, Aeschines would seize upon Macedon’s juggernaut to
punish his adversaries; indeed, Demosthenes accuses Aeschines
of capitalizing on recent adversity (18.308).
But there is another explanation with a respectable lineage,
one that has the advantage of considering the rules before the
motives: Schaeffer concluded (in the 1850s) that Demosthenes’
backers must have forced the issue;4 for both speeches expect
336, Aeschines’ “fourth kairos”), and why neither speaker blames the other for
the long delay.
2 G. L. Cawkwell, “The Crowning of Demosthenes,” CQ 19 (1969) 163–
180, at 166–167, drawing upon Heinrich Reich, “Bemerkungen zum Prozess
Ktesiphon,” in Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft:
[für] Wilhelm von Christ (Munich 1891) 280–293; followed by Ian Worthington,
Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece (New York 2013) 294–295.
3 The old assumption, that the author of a decree was immune after a year,
was due to confusion in later tradition; the limit properly applies to γραφαὶ
νόµον µὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι. See H. J. Wolff, “Normenkontrolle” und Gesetzesbegriff
in der attischen Demokratie (Heidelberg 1970) 10 n.8; Edwin Carawan, “The
Trial of the Arginousai Generals and the Dawn of ‘Judicial Review’,” Dike 10
(2007) 19–56, at 32–38.
4 A. Schaeffer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 2 III (Leipzig 1887 [1st ed. 1858])
225–227. F. Winiewski, Commentarii historici et chronologici in Demosthenis orationem
De Corona (Münster 1829) 290, had drawn the same conclusion but assumed
that in 330 the crowning was a conciliatory gesture toward Macedon, as
Demosthenes had been especially responsible for Athenian neutrality.
—————
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Demosthenes to be crowned if Aeschines is defeated,5 and that
could not happen unless the measure was given new life by
council or assembly.6 Of course, there is a way around the procedural hurdle: perhaps, as Goodwin suggested,7 the revival of
the decree came after the court victory; presumably, the speechwriters anticipated the sequel or wrote it in post eventum. But that
approach discounts the evidence in order to save the assumptions, and there is good reason to be wary of where it takes us: if
Aeschines revived his case before the decree was resurrected, the
lawsuit would seem both flimsy and pointless—the old charges
had lost their edge and the old proposal was still dead. The other
motives often adduced seem no less arbitrary: Aeschines may
have been threatened with a penalty for failing to follow through
on his lawsuit but, if that was his reason for proceeding, why
now, when he had been largely inactive and no less at risk for
some years?
In more recent work scholars acknowledge that the crowning
was again viable but assume nonetheless that Aeschines forced
the issue, without explaining how that would work.8 The present
study is an attempt to do just that. The evidence we have suggests that Ctesiphon’s proposal was renewed first and Aeschines
then revived his case against it. So the question is not why
Aeschines proceeded at that time but why Demosthenes’ backers
renewed the Crown proposal when they did. There are, after all,
indications in the speeches and in later tradition that Ctesiphon’s
Aeschin. 3.153–156, 211, 253–254, 259; Dem. 18.85, 266.
The rule is spelled out in Aristokrates’ case, Dem. 23.92: ἄκυρόν ἐστι τὸ
ψήφισµα· προβούλευµα γάρ ἐστιν, ὁ νόµος δ’ ἐπέτεια κελεύει τὰ τῆς βουλῆς
εἶναι ψηφίσµατα. Cf. Schaeffer, Demosthenes III 84–6 [= 1858: 77–79]; M. H.
Hansen, The Sovereignty of the People’s Court (Odense 1974) 51–52, and “Graphe
Paranomon against Psephismata not yet passed by the Ekklesia,” ClMed 38 (1987)
63–73.
7 W. W. Goodwin, Demosthenes On the Crown (Cambridge 1901) 329–330.
8 Cf. Hermann Wankel, Demosthenes Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz (Heidelberg 1976) 18–25; Harvey Yunis, Demosthenes On the Crown (Cambridge 2001)
7–12.
5
6
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proposal was revived in council and assembly, it was in response
to that maneuver that Aeschines reasserted his challenge, and
the issue was then framed in a decree for trial. That possibility,
that the assembly should intervene, has been largely neglected
in the scholarship, perhaps because it does not fit with modern
thinking about judicial review:9 we like to assume that the constitutional remedy belongs in the court and the legislature should
not interfere. But, even in the fourth century, the Athenian dēmos
seems unconstrained by any separation of powers and all too
willing to plot the course of justice.10 This essay proceeds from
that perspective, beginning with the procedural clues and then
considering the motives, as follows:
(1) The council of 330/29 resurrected the old probouleuma and
thus the measure was at last introduced in the assembly, for the
people to decide upon the old decree de novo. Then, when the
decree was brought before the assembly, Aeschines reasserted
his challenge to it. And so, in the face of his continued obstruction, the people decreed that the issue be decided at trial:
whoever challenged the measure as unlawful would face an assesssed penalty, if he failed to win one fifth of the votes.11 Under
that threat, Aeschines could have withdrawn his challenge but,
to judge from what he says about the situation in 330, he thought
he could still make a viable case on the legalities and discredit
Demosthenes at last for the failings of his policy.
(2) We are not told explicitly why the decree was renewed in
this way, but the parallel case of Hyperides’ decree for Demosthenes, now represented in a large fragment of the speech Against
Diondas, suggests a likely explanation. This earlier decree to
9 E.g., W. W. Goodwin, “The Athenian γραφὴ παρανόµων and the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,” TAPA 26 (1895) lx–lxi.
10 Notably in sentencing officers without trial, as in the cases of Timagoras
(368/7), and of Callisthenes and Ergophilus (363/2): see M. H. Hansen,
Eisangelia (Odense 1975) 92–95, nos. 82, 85–86. In other instances the dēmos
dictates arrangements for court trial, even in absentia (Hansen nos. 83–84, 88–
90).
11 As in eisangelia (at some point); cf. Theophrastus fr.636C Fortenbaugh,
n.15 below.
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honor Demosthenes was, indeed, proposed and challenged in
338/7 and then came to trial in 334 (much as Westermann
supposed for Ctesiphon’s decree). And when it came to court, it
became a referendum on the fate of Demosthenes in the face of
Alexander’s demand for his surrender. Ctesiphon’s decree, with
much the same language, was probably revived amid similar
concerns in 330.
Thus, in the following sections, we approach the problem first
from one side, then the other:
§I deals with Aeschines’ situation, the considerations that
might have prompted him to take up the case in 330, and what
jeopardy he faced. In §II we turn to the defense: there is no
question but that Ctesiphon is liable for his proposal, but the real
target of the lawsuit is Demosthenes himself. What, after all, was
really at issue when the case came to trial? Of course, if Ctesiphon’s proposal was in conflict with the standing laws in 336, it
still counts against him in 330. But, for many among the jury,
the first count in the indictment must have seemed little more
than hypothetical: it would have been illegal to crown Demosthenes
before his accounting in 336, but when the proposal was revived
in 330, he had long since fulfilled that obligation. Conversely,
Aeschines may have been liable all these years, at least in principle, for failing to proceed with his case,12 but conventional
remedies for reckless prosecution seem to have been rarely used
and the penalty was no great burden.13 Yet, when the case came
to court, his very liberty was at risk, “the prosecutor has become
12 Owing a penalty of 1000 drachmas, if not denied the right to prosecute
certain cases in future. Robert Wallace, “Withdrawing Graphai in Ancient
Athens,” Symposion 2003 (Vienna 2006) 57–66, argued that in most cases (except lipotaxiou) the additional penalty (stripping him of the right to litigate) was
limited to those instances where the prosecutor took payment to abandon the
case; in his response, 67–72, Edward Harris insists that the disability applied
broadly if the prosecutor failed to appear at anakrisis or later at trial.
13 Aeschines seems to have been largely inactive and unindicted in the
period 336–330. Cf. Reich, Abh. Christ 291–293, discounting the notion (in
[Plut.] 840C–D) that Aeschines could not pay the fine.

—————
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defendant” (Aeschin. 3.193), and he was, indeed, driven into
exile by the vote against him.14
I. Aeschines’ Predicament
It may lend some clarity to this problem to begin with the outcome. The conventional view of Aeschines’ liability was simply
that he faced a regular, statutory penalty, such as anyone would
suffer for ‘frivolous’ or reckless prosecution: for failing to win one
fifth of the ballots (as for failing to proceed), he would owe the
fine of ten minas and be barred from public prosecution, to some
degree.15 It is not quite clear how that bar to litigation applied.
Paoli may yet be right in supposing that—at least for some time
in some cases—l’accusatore temerario simply suffered the disability
that came with his debt to the polis: the offender was atimos until
he paid.16 There are some indications in the speeches and later
tradition that an additional penalty (apart from the fine) barred
the offender from using public suits.17 But the strongest testimony to the severest penalty comes from this case against
Ctesiphon, and it seems to be describing a special provision of
Plut. Dem. 24.2–3 confirms that the judges so emphatically rejected
Aeschines’ case, “that he did not receive one fifth of the ballots; and so he
immediately departed from the city.”
15 Theophrastus fr.636C Fortenbaugh (Lex.Cant. s.v. πρόστιµον) reports a
general rule, in public suits other than eisangelia, barring a litigator from
litigation if he either failed to win one fifth of the votes or failed to proceed:
ἔκειτο τῷ µὴ µεταλαβόντι τὸ πέµπτον µέρος τῶν ψήφων, ὡς Θεόφραστος ἐν
πέµπτῳ Περὶ νόµων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δηµοσίοις ἀγῶσιν ἐζηµιοῦντο χιλίαις καὶ
πρόσεστί τις ἀτιµία, ὥστε µὴ ἐξεῖναι µήτε γράψασθαι παρανόµων µήτε
φαίνειν µήτε ἐφηγεῖσθαι· ἐὰν δέ τις γραψάµενος µὴ ἐπεξέλθῃ, ὁµοίως· περὶ
δὲ τῆς εἰσαγγελίας, ἐάν τις µὴ µεταλάβῃ τὸ πέµπτον µέρος τῶν ψήφων, οἱ
δικασταὶ τιµῶσιν.
16 U. E. Paoli, Studi sul processo attico (Padua 1933) 320–325, emphasizing
[Dem.] 58.6–15; followed by A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens II (Oxford
1971) 169–176 (esp.175, on this point).
17 For the fragment of Theophrastos (n.15 above), E. M. Harris, in review
of D. M. MacDowell, Demosthenes Against Meidias, CP 87 (1992) 79–80, points
to the variant in schol. Dem. 22 (at §3), παράνοµον for παρανόµων, as evidence that graphai, etc., against any illegality were barred.
14
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the decree for these irregular proceedings, not the usual consequence for reckless prosecution.
To be sure, one strand of the tradition tells that Aeschines was
simply fined and could not or would not pay the fine; under
atimia on that account, he went into exile and ultimately set up
shop in Rhodes. Ps.-Plutarch (Lives of the Ten Orators 840C–D)
begins with that version of the story: after failing to win one fifth
of the votes, Aeschines fled to Rhodes, “refusing to pay the
thousand drachmas charged to his defeat.” But, the author adds,
“other sources say, an additional penalty of atimia was assessed
and he left the city unwillingly,” setting out for Ephesus to meet
with Alexander. The details are consistent with other reports,18
and the implication, that he was driven into exile by a penalty
specifically assessed, also finds support in later tradition. The Life
of Aeschines attributed to Apollonius has this report: “Having
specified an additional penalty if he failed to prove the measure
paranomon, as he lost the case, because he was unable to pay the
judgment that he himself had specified, he resorted to exile.”19
That tradition was followed by Photius: “[Aeschines] himself set
the penalty he would face, if he failed to prove the act unlawful,
and as he failed to prove (the charge) as he promised, he went
into exile.”20 These notices indicate a special provision burdening the prosecutor in this case, which would have to be spelled
out in a decree for trial. And there are indications in both
speeches of some such ad hoc arrangement.
18 V.Aeschin. 2 (anon.) Blass: µὴ µεταλαβεῖν τὸ πέµπτον µέρος τῶν ψήφων,
ἀτιµωθέντα δ’ ἀπᾶραι εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἔφεσον οἰηθέντα κατάξειν αὐτὸν εἰς Ἀθήνας Ἀλέξανδρον; Aeschines turned to Rhodes at Alexander’s death.
19 V.Aeschin. 3 (Ἀπολλωνίου): καὶ ὁρίσαντος τὸ πρόστιµον ἐὰν µὴ δείξῃ αὐτὸ
παράνοµον καὶ ἡττηθέντος καὶ διὰ τὸ µὴ δύνασθαι καταβαλεῖν τὴν καταδίκην, ἣν αὐτὸς ὥρισε, φυγῇ χρησαµένου. The biographer cites a work “For
the Crown” (ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἔγνωµεν ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου).
20 Photius Bibl. cod. 61, 20a.20–23 (I 59 Henry): καὶ ὁρίσας τὸ πρόστιµον
αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, ἐὰν µὴ δείξῃ παράνοµον, µὴ δείξας ὡς ὑπέσχετο ἐξέπεσε τῆς
πατρίδος. Photius also reports that Aeschines set out to join Alexander but
resorted to Rhodes after the conqueror’s death.

—————
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In his prologue Aeschines is irate about a maneuver by the
prytaneis and presiders who managed the proceedings in council
and assembly (3):
Now some men readily author unlawful proposals, and these
measures are put to a vote by others who serve as presiders, who
were not allotted that office rightfully but whose selection was
rigged (ἐκ παρασκευῆς). And if one among the other councilmen,
who was really allotted the presidency, tried to announce the tally
of your votes, he is threatened with impeachment by those who
regard the constitution no longer as common property but their
own personal asset. They make slaves of private citizens and make
much of their own dynasteia; they dissolve the trials that laws prescribe and set trial by decrees decided in anger.

This passage is usually read as a rant against systemic dysfunction with no particular relevance,21 but it describes just the
sort of rule-bending required to bring Ctesiphon’s proposal back
to life: it had the support of a faction in the council who somehow arranged to control the presidency, violating protocol and
threatening to prosecute anyone who objected. So Aeschines
goes on to complain that debate in the assembly is “no longer
controlled by the laws or the prytaneis or the (rightful) proedroi, nor
even by the tribe in prytany.” Amid such disorder, there is only
one portion of the politeia still standing, the suits for unlawful
action: “And if you undo even these—or give permission to those
who are busily undoing them—then, I tell you, little by little you
will abandon the constitution without even realizing it” (5).
Thus Aeschines insists that the graphē paranomōn itself is under
attack and, it seems reasonable to suppose, the issue at hand is a
case in point. It is that abuse of the system that gives particular
relevance to the commonplace that follows (6–8): As everyone
knows, there are three forms of government; the important
difference is that democracies are governed by their standing
laws, while tyrannies and oligarchies govern by the disposition
of those in control. The suit against unlawful action is the chief
21 E.g. F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit2 III.2 (1898) 233–234 [=1880, 205–
206]; followed for the most part by R. B. Richardson, Aeschines Against Ctesiphon
(Boston 1889) 36–37.

—————
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safeguard against those who are eager to bend the constitution
to their will: “Let no one among you fail to recognize that …
when he enters the courtroom to decide a graphē paranomōn, on
this day he will cast his ballot on the very freedom of speech.”
Yet, he claims, the proper functioning of the procedure itself is
being undermined by recent maneuvers, and it was precisely to
guard against such erosions that the lawgiver put first in the
judges’ oath: “ ‘I shall cast my ballot in accord with the laws’. For
[the lawgiver] knew well that, if the city keeps watch over the
laws, it will also keep the democracy secure” (6). The jurors must
keep that principle in mind and stand their ground, as guardians
of the constitution.
Then again, after his argument is largely concluded, Aeschines
returns to his protest against irregular proceedings in a section
that seems specifically adapted to the situation in 330 (191–194).
He has just argued that the culture of self-promotion is out of
hand, comparing the modest and often nameless memorials of
the past (178–185) and concluding with Archinus’ decree for the
heroes who restored democracy in 403 (187). For comparison,
he has the clerk read out Ctesiphon’s decree once again (188). It
is the worst sort of fraud: this crowning for “saying and doing
what is best for the city” honors the very man who should bear
the blame for the greatest evils, and it virtually erases the honors
for those who restored democracy in the time of our fathers.
Rather, let their story be a lesson: the first step in establishing
oligarchy is to suspend the suits against unlawful action.22 Aeschines’ history may be simplistic but the relevance should be
clear enough: the recent legislative maneuver to revive Ctesiphon’s proposal, long after it should have died without a vote, is
the same sort of prelude to autocracy that their (grand)fathers
witnessed. After all, the challenge to Ctesiphon’s decree, which
should have barred it from taking effect, has been somehow undone.
What follows (192) is meant to legitimize his case, however
22 Aeschin. 3.191: ὁ δῆµος κατελύθη ἐπειδή τινες τὰς γραφὰς τῶν παρανόµων ἀνεῖλον.

—————
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flimsy the legalities may seem. Aeschines says that his aged father
recounted how he had witnessed regular recourse to graphai paranomōn in the early restoration era, in which juries were quick to
convict for even a single defect; they did not reserve their wrath
for measures that violate “all the laws,” as now. These days “the
secretary reads the unlawful proposal and the judges, as though
they are listening to an encantation … have their minds on
something else.”
And now, by the artfulness of Demosthenes, you are taking up a
shameful practice in the courts. For the city’s judicial proceedings
are turned around: the prosecutor becomes defendant and the
defendant prosecutes; and sometimes the judges forget what they
are judges of, compelled to cast their ballot on claims they were
not called to decide.23

Again the complaint is usually dismissed as a distraction,24 but it
is likely to have a particular bearing on the case at hand. Somehow, after blocking the proposal for six years, Aeschines saw the
tables turned.
As though on cue, Demosthenes frames his defense as a plea
for the jury to take proper retribution against Aeschines. In his
prologue (18.13) he envisions some measure to stop the troublemaker once and for all, to repay him for all the calculated malice
that he brought to the city’s deliberations. And as he proceeds to
his peroration (266), he taunts Aeschines with losing the right to
carry on with such tactics, if he fails to win one fifth of the votes.
But he makes the point most emphatically in the midst of his
arguments, after defending his own role in the Peace of Philocrates, in 82–83. He recalls that Aeschines regularly accused him of
bribe-taking, and now he calls upon the jury to put a stop to it:
23 Aeschin. 3.193: ἤδη δ’ ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν Δηµοσθένους αἰσχρὸν ἔθος ἐν
τοῖς δικαστηρίοις παραδέχεσθε. µετενήνεκται γὰρ ὑµῖν τὰ τῆς πόλεως
δίκαια· ὁ µὲν γὰρ κατήγορος ἀπολογεῖται, ὁ δὲ φεύγων τὴν γραφὴν κατηγορεῖ,
οἱ δὲ δικασταὶ ἐνίοτε ὧν µέν εἰσι κριταὶ ἐπιλανθάνονται, ὧν δ’ οὐκ εἰσὶ
δικασταί, περὶ τούτων ἀναγκάζονται τὴν ψῆφον φέρειν.
24 E.g. Richardson, Aeschines Against Ctesiphon 194–195, “the same commonplace is more cleverly applied in Dem. xix. 213.”

—————
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 59 (2019) 109–133

EDWIN CARAWAN

119

Aeschines claims that “I keep quiet when I’ve gotten something
and shout (for more) when I’ve spent it. But not you [Aeschines],
who shout when you’ve gotten (paid for it) and won’t ever stop,
unless these (judges) stop you today with atimia” (παύσει δ’ οὐδέποτ’ ἐὰν µή σ’ οὗτοι παύσωσιν ἀτιµώσαντες τήµερον). Again,
it is often supposed that Aeschines would merely face the regular
consequences of reckless prosecution: he loses a thousand
drachmas and his right to bring certain public suits.25 But here
Demosthenes is insisting upon a more radical loss-of-rights; for,
if Aeschines faced only the fine and the bar to graphai of one sort
or another, it would hardly silence him in the assembly and at
trial by other remedies.
These passages in the speeches, together with the notices in
later tradition (nn.19–20 above), suggest that a rider was added
when Ctesiphon’s decree was revived: if the measure was challenged (yet again), the case would go to the jury, and the
sentencing would borrow a provision from eisangelia;26 if the
challenger proved guilty of reckless prosecution (failing to win
one fifth of the votes), the court would decide upon his penalty.
There is a persistent theme in Demosthenes’ attack on
Aeschines (carried over from the Embassy Case) that may have
made this arrangement seem suitable when the issue was raised
in the assembly: Demosthenes insists that Aeschines must be
25 Theophrastus fr.636C (n.15 above) names graphai paranomōn, phasis, and
ephēgēsis as the remedies barred. The first two were notorious instruments of
sykophantia, as the prosecutor seizes the advantage merely by initiating his suit.
In graphai paranomōn, the targeted legislation is blocked by the challenge under
oath; in phasis, the ship or other asset is encumbered by public notice until
there is some resolution to the case ([Dem.] 58.9–10). Ephēgēsis is not labeled
a tool of extortion but might serve: the accuser leads the Eleven to make the
arrest. In other graphai, if the prosecutor does not proceed, the case simply
collapses. So it seems reasonable to sanction reckless prosecution in these particular instances, while other remedies (such as eisangelia, apagōgē, and endeixis)
remain available. It need not imply a more general bar to all public remedies,
as Harris has argued, CP 87 (1992) 79.
26 As in Theophrastos fr.636C, concluding περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰσαγγελίας, ἐάν τις
µὴ µεταλάβῃ τὸ πέµπτον µέρος τῶν ψήφων, οἱ δικασταὶ τιµῶσιν.
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punished as a “traitor,” prodotēs.27 Spengel’s treatment of Ctesiphon’s defense (from 1861) remains notable in this regard: much
of his essay deals with the litany of accusations against Aeschines
for betraying Athens; Spengel recognized the huge cloud of recrimination hanging over the prosecutor, but he reduced it to a
non liquet. Even the most compelling of Demosthenes’ charges,
that Aeschines was to blame for all the advantages Philip had
gained—by the Peace of Philocrates (32–49) and later by
Aeschines’ initiative at the Amphictyonic Council (142–153)—
provide no proof that Aeschines actually conspired to that end.28
And yet the allegations are likely to have consequences. After all,
in the Athenian assembly, there was no need to prove specific
intent in order to condemn a man for prodosia. The fate of the
Arginusae generals is a case in point: the charge against them
was not that they abandoned the casualties for some malicious
end but simply that they failed to do as duty required. By the
same standard, Aeschines had acted with reckless disregard of
what he was giving up to the enemy. The blame did not amount
to an indictment but certainly seems to have weighed against
him.
Now the Arginusae case (from 406) may be instructive as well
with regard to the decree for trial. Remember, as Xenophon tells
it,29 Callixeinus had brought forward a decree of council, for the
assembly to decide upon the generals’ impeachment (eisangelia).
When Euryptolemus demanded due process and challenged the
decree as unlawful (paranomon), he was threatened with the same
fate the generals would face. To be clear, he was not threatened
with the same charge as the generals; there is no description of prodosia that would apply. Callixeinus’ proposal (which is spelled out
at Hell. 1.7.9–10) charges the generals for “failing to recover”
their comrades (οὐκ ἀνελόµενοι); on that issue, the dēmos is to
Leonhard Spengel, “Demosthenes Vertheidigung des Ktesiphon,” Abh.
Münch. 10 (1861) 29–97, at 47–50, 69–70, 90–93.
28 “Und Aeschines? ist er ein Verräther? Unmöglich wäre es nicht, dass er
von Philippus bestochen gegen besseres Wissen und Gewissen gesprochen
hätte, aber Demosthenes hat es keineswegs bewiesen” (Spengel 50).
29 Xen. Hell. 1.7.12–16; cf. Carawan, Dike 10 (2007) 19–22.
27
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cast ballots tribe by tribe. When Euryptolemus blocked that proposal with his sworn challenge, Callixeinus et al. could not
simply dismiss the hypomosia by charging Euryptolemus with
something else; Callixeinus’ proposal was blocked until that case
was decided—or until Euryptolemus withdrew his complaint (as
he prudently would do). So Lyciscus added a rider calling for
anyone who challenged the decree “to be judged by the same
ballot as the generals, if they would not abandon their complaint”: τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἐὰν
µὴ ἀφῶσι τὴν κλῆσιν. That is, if Euryptolemus would not withdraw his challenge, the verdict would decide at once the legality
of the decree (to execute the generals or not) and the fate of those
who opposed it. That probably means that the charge of paranoma would be decided by the same vote that Callixeinus had
prescribed for the generals (with ballots and urns, tribe by tribe)
and Euryptolemus would face the same penalty if the vote went
against him.
After all, the assembly regularly dictated arrangements for impeachment by decree, and it was probably not unusual to meet
objections as Lyciscus did, with a rider to fix the procedure.30
Thus in Euryptolemus’ case (had he not withdrawn his challenge), the same vote would have decided the graphē paranomōn
and the fate of the defendants.31 The two cases would be combined: the same penalty that awaited the generals (for prodosia)
would threaten the reckless prosecutor (in his graphē paranomōn)
for obstructing the will of the people.
Similarly in the Crown Case, it looks as though Aeschines
faced resentment for blocking the proposal in the assembly, and
a rider was added to the decree for trial so that he must share
the jeopardy. To that end, it would seem sensible to adopt the
rule from impeachment (eisangelia), with a penalty to be decided
by the jury, if he failed to win one fifth of the votes.
30 Notably in Pericles’ case (Hansen, Eisangelia no. 6): Dracontides’ decree,
for voting on the acropolis with ballots from the altar; Hagnon’s rider moved
the case to court and recast the charge.
31 When vindicated by the court, the proposal is enacted: Hansen, ClMed
38 (1987) 63–73.
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Whatever procedural maneuver brought the case to court in
330, neither speech makes any reference to it, and that omission
is surprising if we suppose that the case was prepared in the ordinary way (in anakrisis before the thesmothetai), without public
hearing. But much of that gap can be closed with this reconstruction: the long delay and the move to revive the case were
hashed out in the assembly, as the people debated the decree for
trial. In effect, that debate in the assembly was the first phase of
these proceedings. Some of the most puzzling disparities in the
speeches—points that one side raises and the other ignores—are
best resolved in this way. Notably, in 209–211 Aeschines portrays Demosthenes in tears, crying, “Where can I find refuge?
… There is no place I can fly away to!”; at which Aeschines
protests, “Where can the Athenian dēmos find refuge, Demosthenes? What alliance stands ready? … Why the tears, why the
outcry? Isn’t Ctesiphon the one on trial?”32
II. What was at stake for the defense in 330?
Holding Demosthenes to account
In 6–8, Aeschines insisted that the jury must be guardians of
the constitution, and on that note he returned to the rule against
crowning anyone who faces accounting. We might expect
Aeschines to explain why that rule still matters in this case, six
years after Demosthenes passed the accountings in question. He
might have insisted that, although the point now seems academic, it was a violation of law in 336 and Ctesiphon is still liable
for it. He never makes that argument. Rather, ingeniously, he
will try to show that there is still one item for which Demosthenes
has never yet faced accounting. But first, following close upon
that image of the jury as guardians of the constitution, he proceeds to explain at some length why the rule against crowningbefore-accounting was conceived and what its purpose must be
(9–12): sometime in the past, honorific decrees were awarded in
32 In the old debate over the timing of this case (n.1 above) Westermann
treated this passage as evidence that Aeschines revised his speech to answer
what Demosthenes had said at trial, though nothing in Demosthenes’ speech
corresponds.
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mid term to prejudice those who would sit in judgment when the
public servant was called to account; the jurors’ sense of shame
would keep them from condemning the man they had given
such credit. A lawgiver saw through this and made a very sensible law against it; “but arguments have been devised stronger
than the laws, and unless someone tells you so, you will be deceived and never know it.” Without further explanation that
rationale seems to have little relevance to the case at hand, since
Demosthenes is no longer subject to accounting. It could be
stock material carried over from an old draft, but since Aeschines
saw fit to use it in his speech for trial (or for circulation), it ought
to reflect upon some consideration that most of his audience
would recognize. The likely implication, I suggest, is that Demosthenes might yet be held to account for his policy, and the
defense has conjured up this crowning to shield him from that
reckoning.
To be sure, Aeschines insists that, on one item, Demosthenes
has never yet passed accountings for the service that Ctesiphon
would honor. But that technicality may have been dictated by
conventional constraints: rather than simply argue that the
honorand was unworthy, the suit for unlawful action (graphē paranomōn) had to posit some express contradiction between the
decree and the standing law. And in the revived proposal the
strongest contradiction that Aeschines could find essentially
amounts to this:33
Ctesiphon’s decree gave particular recognition to Demosthenes’ service in the Wall Building project in 337/6, and there
were two offices or levels of responsibility that Demosthenes held
in regard to that project:
(α) As director of the Theoric Fund he was in charge of the
fortification project for the city as a whole; in that capacity, he
Aeschines’ argument on the second count, that crowning at the Dionysia
was in conflict with standing law (32–48), also seems a desperate recourse (to
be treated in a further study). It may have been added in 330, as Friedrich
Blass supposed in his first edition of Die attische Beredsamkeit III.2 (Leipzig 1880)
186.
33
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was accountable for the sum of ten talents (or more) that was
collected and expended in that year.
(β) But he was also the teichopoios for Pandionis, called upon by
his tribe to collect their part of the funding and see that it was
put to good use.
In the latter capacity (β) he seems to have contributed the
whole sum of what was owed for his tribe, out of his own
pocket.34 But the rule, under Demosthenes’ own decree, seems
to be that the tribal teichopoioi (β) were accountable to (α) the
director of that project; that is, to Demosthenes himself (τὴν τῶν
τειχοποιῶν ἀρχὴν ἦρχεν). Aeschines does not make the point as
clear as we would like, because his jury in 330 had just heard the
clerk read the decree and other evidence, and they would recall
the objection Aeschines had made in the assembly.
Nonetheless, in itself the charge seems oddly trivial: since
Demosthenes had passed his accountings for his major offices in
336, it was absurd to insist that he was still accountable when the
case comes to trial in 330, for what he had donated six years
earlier. If that old technicality carried any weight with the jury,
it served to remind them of Demosthenes’ personal investment,
from his role in the alliance with Thebes to the recent uprising
of Sparta.
The other crown case: Diondas against Hyperides
In 330 Demosthenes insists that he is accountable for his whole
career (18.8) but he is not very clear about how he will be held
to account for it. A digression late in his speech gives us a clue
and, luckily, new material has come to light that will help us
interpret it. For Demosthenes tells (222–223) that Ctesiphon had
honored him in virtually the same language as had been used in
two (or three) earlier decrees: by Aristonicus in 340 (cf. 18.83)
34 [Plut.] X orat. 846A concludes that 100 minas was the whole of his tribe’s
contribution: καὶ τῶν τειχῶν ἐπιµελητὴς χειροτονηθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας
εἰσήνεγκε τὸ ἀναλωθὲν ἀργύριον, µνᾶς ἑκατόν. The original proposal seems
based on this premise, honoring Demosthenes as a benefactor of his tribe, to
allow for crowning in the theatre if the dēmos approved (Aeschin. 3.41–42,
44).
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and thereafter by Demomeles and Hyperides. Why the fetish of
coronation? Is it simply that Demosthenes could not satisfy his
philotimia? Certainly there are such politicians, past and present.
But if that were all there was to it, we would expect Aeschines to
put it in that perspective; yet he never mentions the previous
crownings.35 Perhaps that silence is to avoid lending credibility
to the decree at hand, but there may have been another, more
important consequence that needed no amplification: the fact
that Alexander was likely to demand the surrender of Demosthenes once again, as he did in 335/4. For that was the reckoning that seems to have revived Demomeles’ decree, when it, too,
had been left for dead.
Demosthenes’ second crowning decree was passed before
Chaeronea and indicted by Diondas in the aftermath; when the
case came to its conclusion, Hyperides successfully defended the
decree and it then took effect. Until a decade or so ago, the
speech against Diondas was known only from a few references;
it was generally supposed that the sequence of legislation and
litigation unfolded without interruption36 and thus concluded
before Aeschines’ case against Ctesiphon even began. Now a
substantial fragment of the speech has been recovered from palimpsest and subjected to meticulous study.37 Some questions
35 Here he mentions Demomeles only as defendant in a case (of wounding)
that Demosthenes brought at the Areopagus (3.51). Elsewhere (2.93) Aeschines had claimed that Demosthenes was fined for failing to proceed in that
case; so he might have claimed that Demomeles’ decree was some sort of payoff.
36 Dem. 18. 222–223; [Plut.] X orat. 848F and 846A (mistaking Diondas for
“Diodotus”). From these references it was once concluded that there two decrees authored by Demomeles and Hyperides; and the natural presumption
was that both cases were decided in due course, within the year. Thus
Spengel, Abh.Wien 10 (1861) 82, acknowledging (n.1) that Diondas may have
brought suit after Chaeronea. Goodwin, Demosthenes On the Crown 159, recognized that “the two names probably indicate a decree moved by Demomeles
… and amended or enlarged by Hyperides.”
37 See Christopher Carey et al., “Fragments of Hyperides Against Diondas
from the Archimedes Palimpsest,” ZPE 165 (2008) 1–19, with description of
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remain but the key findings are fairly solid, and the parallel with
Ctesiphon’s case seems to me compelling: in both cases, we have
a suit against a crown decree that is postponed for some years
and then revived when recent events reveal no clear advantage
for the prosecutor and no new achievement for the honorand
but all the more reason to show support for him in peril.
Hyperides’ speech defends a decree to honor Demosthenes
that passed in the assembly but was blocked by a lawsuit, left in
abeyance for more than two years, and then somehow brought
to trial with the consequences undiminished: either the author
of the decree would be punished or the crowning would be carried out. Demosthenes mentions the case as though it targeted
his cousin Demomeles as well as Hyperides, for a decree honoring Demosthenes on the eve of Chaeronea (18.222–223): when
it came to trial Diondas won fewer than one fifth of the ballots.
That conclusion to the case can now be dated with some confidence to the winter or spring of 335/4.38
Hyperides describes Diondas as an extortionist litigator of the
worst sort, a sykophantēs who brought many lawsuits to force payment or other compliance, rarely risking a trial.39 The case at
hand was probably the last such gamble before Diondas vanished from the legal and political scene. Horváth suggests that
Diondas revived the case when he expected to leave Athens and
join the Macedonian crusade against Persia, so he had little to
lose. That recourse probably factored into his decision, but he
must have known that public opinion was largely hostile to
Macedon, and that, if he revived the case and then lost it, the
the text and credit to earlier research; Lázló Horváth, “Hyperidea,” BICS 52
(2009) 187–222, and P. J. Rhodes, “Hyperides’ Against Diondas: Two Problems,” BICS 223–228. Horváth has provided text and apparatus at http://
hypereidoc.elte.hu.
38 Horváth concludes, BICS 52 (2009) 196, “the speech was delivered between January and March 334 BC.” Rhodes, 223–226, suggests that the trial
came as late as May or June, when Diondas would take courage from Alexander’s dedication at Athens from the spoils of Granicus (Arr. Anab. 1.16.7).
39 And yet, apparently, Diondas was never barred for reckless prosecution,
until this case.
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crowning of Demosthenes, which he had thwarted thus far,
would at last succeed. He must have had little choice, and so it
seems more likely that Hyperides and his group forced the issue:
they revived the decree when it suited their agenda, and Diondas
was compelled to contest it. But, again, how would that work?
Hyperides calls upon the Athenians to recognize what had
become of their constitutional remedy in the wrong hands (p.3
Carey = 145r lines 3–9):
I am on trial for what you have already decided. And yet, … just
as you think you must punish those who write decrees, if anyone
authors anything against the interest of the dēmos, so, too, you
should hold to account those that bring the indictments (in those
cases). For it is no less a wrong to obstruct what is in the people’s
interest by trumping up charges than it is to draft unlawful acts.

There is no question but that Hyperides is the one in jeopardy,
yet his liability goes back to the decree of 338, when Demomeles
proposed to honor his cousin Demosthenes at the Dionysia the
following spring. Then, sometime after the battle, Diondas challenged the decree, before the honors could be proclaimed in the
theatre. Later Demosthenes (in 330) speaks as though Demomeles and Hyperides were authors of psēphismata, plural, but he
is probably referring to the same measure, a decree initiated by
Demomeles and revived by Hyperides. For Demosthenes speaks
as though their combined efforts were vindicated when Diondas’
lawsuit was so resoundingly defeated.
From that testimony scholars have long supposed that Hyperides simply added a rider to Demomeles’ decree, but the new
fragment complicates that explanation: for Hyperides, in 335/4,
proceeds as though he is the one defendant who will be answerable for the decree that, presumably, Demomeles initiated. Now
Hyperides has much to say about who is in jeopardy but he
never mentions or alludes to Demomeles. To be sure, what we
have is but a fragment of what was probably a lengthy speech,
but if the elder cousin of Demosthenes were Hyperides’ codefendant, we might expect him to be indicated somewhere in
these arguments, where Hyperides insists, “I am on trial for what
you have … decided.” Instead, by this time Demomeles seems to
—————
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be out of the picture. He had been at least in his sixties, perhaps
seventy or so, when he proposed the measure in 338.40 So, let us
suppose, Hyperides took up the case when his colleague was no
longer active but other considerations became urgent. 41
After the death of Philip, Aeschines claims (160), Demosthenes
had carried on triumphant, as though Philip’s successor were a
ridiculous pretender, a Margites. And then, when Thebes rose
in revolt and Alexander came to deal with it, Demosthenes was
elected ambassador to negotiate with him; but the vaunted
champion of the dēmos turned back in trepidation—for good
reason. For Alexander would demand his surrender as one of
the instigators of that insurrection (Diod. 17.15). At that juncture
(in 335/4), the Athenians rallied around Demosthenes and refused to surrender him to Alexander or to the synod of Greek
states that followed his lead (161). Thereafter, as Aeschines tells
it, Demosthenes managed to win some indulgence from Alexander through the seductive appeal of a mutual companion (162).
And that rapprochement (allegedly) explains why Demosthenes
had no proposal to offer when a more plausible match for Macedon emerged, when the Persian king, with all his wealth and
power, advanced to meet Alexander in Asia Minor (163–164):
“Did you say anything at all, or author any decree” to take any
action?
As for the rebellion that arose under Spartan leadership in
331, Aeschines demands (165–166), “What, after all, did you
(actually) do?” Evidently Demosthenes put on quite an act (167):
“you whirled around the bēma claiming that you were working
against Alexander, ‘I confess to raising Laconia in revolt, I confess to stirring up Thessalians [and others] to rebellion’.” Of
course Aeschines has only contempt for that claim, but there was
probably something to it. In any event, however trivial Demosthenes’ role in rekindling the rebellion, he was bound to claim
Davies, APF 3597 III.B (p.116).
The case Against Leptines (Dem. 20) is a partial parallel: the suit against
unfitting legislation (νόµον µὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι) was initiated by Bathippus
and, after his death, taken up by his son Apsephion more than a year later;
in the meantime other litigators seem to have abandoned the case (20.145).
40
41
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credit. Such claims would become known to Alexander and convince him that the time had come at last to hold to account this
dēmotikos who kept stirring up insurrection.
It is at this point in the speech (168) that Aeschines turns intently upon the consummate “man of the people,” matching the
true qualifications of such a figure against the failings of Demosthenes (as Aeschines sees them). That tag, dēmotikos, seems to
have taken on a special importance at this juncture, when the
next-to-last gasp of rebellion was throttled and Demosthenes was
expected to be blamed for it. Emissaries from Pella were likely
to demand his surrender, but his defenders would protest that
Demosthenes was in fact, as his very name proclaims, the bulwark of the people, the one who had steadfastly risked life and
liberty to say and do what was best in their cause. And so, to
reaffirm their faith in him and preempt the demands of the overlord, his backers had revived Ctesiphon’s old decree.
Likewise in the earlier instance, three years after Demomeles
proposed to crown his cousin, Hyperides revived the decree that
Diondas had blocked and left for dead. It was the threat to
Athenian autonomy in the winter of 335/4 that prompted that
measure of support for Demosthenes in his peril. After all, as
Aeschines explained (9–12), the purpose of honoring an officer
before the end of his term was to prejudice those who would sit
in judgment when he was called to account. And the fragment
Against Diondas seems to acknowledge that motive.
Hyperides puts the backdrop to this case amid political
maneuvers at Athens after the revolt of Thebes was crushed and
Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes, Lycurgus,
and other spokesmen of the opposition. Diodorus reports that
Phocion called for Demosthenes and the others to sacrifice
themselves for the salvation of the city, just as the martyrs of
early Attica had done; but the people shouted him down.42 Then
Demosthenes delivered an inspiring speech, and Demades came
forward with an “artfully composed decree” (ψήφισµα γεγραµµένον φιλοτεχνῶς), to answer Alexander’s demand with a more
42

Diod. 17.15; cf. Arr. Anab. 1.10.
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tolerable concession: the men whom Alexander accused of insurrection would face Athenian justice, for the court of the
people to “punish them according to the laws, if they deserved
retribution” (κολάζειν κατὰ τοὺς νόµους, ἂν ὦσιν ἄξιοι τιµωρίας). And, evidently, Demades’ artful arguments persuaded
Alexander that he had more to gain from litigious infighting at
Athens than by making martyrs of his enemies. That seems the
best setting for the revival of the decree from 338; for, in the
pages we have, there are passages that respond to pressure from
Macedon to deliver up Demosthenes et al.
In the case at hand Hyperides himself is the one in jeopardy,
if the verdict goes against him; but there is another fate in the
balance. The reference is indirect but the point is plain enough.
For he asks the jury to imagine that their current predicament had
unfolded in the past, when Philip was still alive and plotting
against Athenian interests (p.2 Carey = 137v–136r lines 17–26):
Consider this, men of Athens: if we had been seized and brought
to trial before Philip, what would he have accused us of? Not that
we blocked him from taking Byzantium, led Euboea to revolt,
demolished the alliance he had with the Thebans and made them
our allies? What would we have suffered at his hands? Wouldn’t
we have been put to death? I certainly think so. Then isn’t it
awful, men of Athens, if on the same charges, we must be put in
jeopardy (twice), at the hands of our adversaries (in Macedon) and
before you (in court)?

Now it was Alexander who demanded the surrender of Athenian
leaders, and the jury would recognize that Hyperides’ scenario
reflects upon that situation at hand.43 For the double jeopardy—
at trial in Athens, facing doom in Pella—only makes sense in the
context that Diodorus reports: Alexander has demanded the
surrender of Demosthenes and others, to take retribution for
their troublesome opposition. The speaker indicates that turn of
Hyperides carries on connecting the past and the present (27–31):
“Philip himself not only honored those who acted for him against you but
also agitated for them to be honored among us—so they are inscribed as
proxenoi—but we are barred from confirming the honors that we have given
some among ourselves!”
43
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events, where he alludes to the fate of Thebes: there are Theban
refugees present in court, with nothing left to do but listen to the
arguments—“I would it were not so,” he says, to soften the bitter
reminder. And on that note he cautions the jury (5.25–6.1
Carey):
If you reject this lawsuit, [the Thebans present] will conclude
quite rightly that the accuser is … raving mad, but that you are
sticking to the same [commitments you made] … But if you convict, they would have every right to charge you, as you condemn
yourselves for wrongdoing in the very cause that you called upon
them to join.

The cause that Athens called upon Thebes to join was, of course,
the defense at Chaeronea in 338, for which Demosthenes
claimed singular responsibility. Again, in 335 Demosthenes
claims to have agitated in support of the Theban rebellion, but
Athens had not joined in the insurrection and many of those
refugees may have felt betrayed. For the jury, the recent disaster
to their neighbor does not affect the issue in this case except
insofar as they must either vindicate Demosthenes, who drew
Thebes into their alliance years earlier, or at last renounce him.
So, to sort out these complications: one may reasonably suppose that Diondas was willing to revive his prosecution because
Alexander had crushed the opposition—and perhaps because he
expected to join him in Asia and thus evade any consequences
at Athens (as Horváth suggests). But that scenario does not quite
explain how the old decree in honor of Demosthenes came at
last to trial with Hyperides as defendant and not Demomeles.
From the pages preserved in the palimpsest we might rather conclude that, in response to Demades’ artful proposal, in order to
frustrate any bill of impeachment, Hyperides revived the old decree honoring Demosthenes. And so Diondas had to take up the
cold case.
Years later Demosthenes treats the two cases as substantially
the same: to prosecute Ctesiphon for praising Demosthenes’ role
in the alliance with Thebes is tantamount to retrying what the
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court had already decided by their verdict against Diondas.44 On
a procedural level, the two cases differ, but the parallel may be
closer than scholars have recognized. In Ctesiphon’s case, it was
the council’s proposal, the probouleuma, that was challenged before it could be passed in the assembly, and, ordinarily, the
viability of any such proposal ended with that council’s year. Yet
Ctesiphon’s probouleuma was revived in 330 and, as I have argued
here, it was probably brought to life by a decision of the assembly, with some irregular maneuvering in the council of 330/
329. In Hyperides’ case against Diondas, the decree had passed
but something similar may have happened: the moribund decree
was not likely to be resurrected without some new initiative.45
Two themes in the fragment point to this solution. First,
considerable weight is put upon the pattern of obstruction by
Diondas and others like him; they take advantage of the rules to
bring charges and then let the accused languish without a decision. The implication seems to be that such would have been
the fate of the decree at hand, if no one had taken the initiative
to revive it. And there is also the insistence that the people should
reaffirm their conviction and not abandon what they resolved
years before. On this rationale Hyperides probably proposed
that the old decree, what they “already decided,” at last be carried out, and he probably added a provision against further
obstruction: if Diondas (or anyone else) should insist upon his
sworn challenge, the case must at last proceed to trial. This
measure to defend the leader who “carries on saying and doing
what is best for the polis,” must not be thwarted by the same
tactics that blocked so many initiatives in the people’s interest.
Faced with a decree to this effect, Diondas may have had no
choice but to take his chances in court—and pack his gear for a
tour of duty with Alexander.
44 Dem. 18.224, claiming “double jeopardy,” as though the previous decisions had established an indisputable legitimacy to the Theban alliance, as
Spengel explained, Abh.Wien 10 (1861) 82. S. Usher, Demosthenes: On the Crown
(Warminster 1993) 248, finds it “sophistical to the point of absurdity.”
45 Such cases, with delay of more than a year after passage in the assembly,
must have been rather rare: none listed in Hansen, Sovereignty.
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Similar considerations explain the timing of the Crown Case:
the trial was indeed triggered by the recent rebellion of Agis and
came on the heels of his defeat (as Cawkwell argued), but the
prosecution was not revived by the pro-Macedonians in triumph. Demosthenes had boasted of his role in fomenting
insurrection and he was likely to face the wrath of Alexander yet
again. So Ctesiphon and other backers, with some maneuvering
among the members in council, managed to reintroduce the old
proposal. The purpose was to achieve precisely what Aeschines
warned of in crowning-before-accounting (9–12): to prejudice
the jurors for the more fateful choice they had to make. For
Aeschines reveals not only that crowning is back on the agenda
but also that Demosthenes faces serious jeopardy, if the people
turn against him:46 the Athenians must “send him away, to be
rid of this disaster afflicting all Hellas”; or “seize him like a thief
… for retribution.” If they crown him, they make common cause
with those who violate the peace; only by doing “the opposite,”
by conviction, can they absolve themselves.
October, 2018
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46 3.253–254: οὗτος στεφανοῦσθαι ἀξιοῖ καὶ κηρύττεσθαι οἴεται δεῖν. οὐκ
ἀποπέµψεσθε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς κοινὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συµφοράν; ἢ συλλαβόντες ὡς λῃστὴν τῶν πραγµάτων, ἐπ’ ὀνοµάτων διὰ τῆς πολιτείας πλέοντα, τιµωρήσεσθε; … δόξετε δ’ ἐὰν µὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ὁµογνώµονες
εἶναι τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην, ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆµον τῶν αἰτιῶν.
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